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ABSTRACT
Selling to Reference-dependent Consumers
by
LEUNG Hin Shing
Master of Philosophy

This research studies the optimal price charged by a monopoly ﬁrm when it is facing
reference-dependent consumers (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006). In the model, a
consumer’s total utility from purchasing a good consists of intrinsic utility and gainloss utility, the latter of which is determined by an exogenously determined reference
point. The firm’s optimal pricing depends on the level of the reference point. In
particular, the firm optimally adopts a gain-type pricing strategy when the reference
point is low. In this equilibrium, all consumers who purchase enjoy gain utility (gaintype consumers). When the reference point is high the firm optimally chooses a losstype pricing strategy. In this equilibrium, some consumers who purchase incur loss
utility (loss-type consumers). Moreover, the firm’s equilibrium proﬁt decreases when
the reference point increases. Finally, I discuss various extensions such as selling cost,
participation cost and competition.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

When a consumer is making a decision on purchasing a good, he would consider the
utility received from the good versus the cost of obtaining the good. The utility is
generated from the intrinsic value of the good. However, in reality, we sometimes
cannot know the true value of the good before we really come to the shop and examine
the good. For example, we can only know the functions and specifications of a new
iPhone model from the Apple Conference and the website provided by Apple Inc. The
iPhone is not be released to the market so we can only have certain beliefs on the
functions of the product. This would constitute a reference point, which is a level of
“expectation” on the true intrinsic value of that iPhone formed before examining it.
When a consumer go to the store, he could examine the iPhone model and know the
true intrinsic value of it. Sometimes we would compare the true intrinsic value of the
iPhone with our belief or expectation (the reference point) for making a decision of a
purchase. When we found that the true intrinsic value of the iPhone is greater than our
belief, we would consider it as a “gain”. We would consider such gain as a “surprise”
and it would generate extra utility to us. In order words, such comparison between the
intrinsic value and the expectation of the intrinsic value of the iPhone would add extra
utility we received from purchasing it. On the other hand, if the true intrinsic value of
the iPhone is lower than the belief, we might not purchase the iPhone as we would
consider such transaction is “lower than our expectation” on the product. However,
sometimes in reality even though the true value of the product is lower than our belief,
we would still decide to buy it as long as the total utility received is greater than the
cost of obtaining the good. In this case, although we may regard this purchase as a
“loss”, such loss would not prevent us from purchasing the product. It is different from
the traditional economics theory which states that consumers would only compare the
intrinsic value (which generates utility) with the price (which is the cost of the good),
and then make a decision of purchase. In this case we would consider the situation that
there is a belief (or expectation) of the intrinsic value of the product before knowing
the true intrinsic value of the good, and consumers would compare the true intrinsic
value with their beliefs. Such belief is regarded as the reference point, and the reference
point represents consumers are reference-dependent in reality. Also, the assumption of
the comparison between the true intrinsic value and the reference point by a consumer
implies that the total utility received from purchasing a good by a reference-dependent
1

consumer consists of two parts: (i) utility generated from the true intrinsic value of
good, and (ii) utility generated from comparing the intrinsic value with the reference
point. It serves an important basis for studying the optimal price set by a monopoly
when it faces reference-dependent consumers. The reference point can be formed from
various sources. The case mentioned previously states that the reference point is
constituted by those information provided by a firm. As the new iPhone model is not
launched to the market yet, those information such as functions and specifications of
the iPhone, are all provided by the firm. Consumers could only access to those
information provided by the firm and form the reference point. In reality, in addition
to the information provided by the firm, there are some other sources which would
constitute a formation of a reference point, such as the consumers’ expectations
towards the products (which might not necessarily involve the information provided
from firm), status quo (for example, the value received from the product they are
currently using), past events (previous purchase of the good from the same firm), or
product from another firm (similar good which is offered by another firm) etc.
Although there are various sources of formation of a reference point, from consumers’
perspective, the decision of the purchase made by a consumer involves merely
comparing the true intrinsic value with the reference point no matter how the source
of the reference point was formed.

A monopoly firm, who would like to maximize the profit when facing referencedependent consumers, now has to consider extra variables such as the reference point
and the factors that affect the magnitude of reference point such that they would
influence the utility received by the consumers. It is because those factors would affect
the demand faced by the firm. Then firm has to set the optimal price, based on the
reference point observed by the firm. As it is mentioned that consumers would consider
their purchase as a gain or a loss, the demand faced by the firm might include these
two types of consumers. Different prices set by the firm under a same level of reference
point could lead to two scenarios. Firstly, the demand, according to the price set by the
firm, consists of both two types of consumers. Another scenario would be, the price
set by firm might drive out those consumers who would consider the transaction as
loss from the market, and thus the demand consists of those consumers who would
consider the transaction as gain. Therefore, to maximize the profit, the firm has to
2

consider the demand as a result of the price it set for given a level of referencedependence. If the firm found that it is more profitable to set a price such that all
consumers are holding a belief on the good that is greater than the true intrinsic value
of good, then it would be the optimal price for the firm. Therefore, the optimal pricing
strategies of the firm depends on the reference point formed by consumers. In fact,
consumers would prefer to have a low reference point. The intuition is that, a low
reference point could bring a high surprise (for a case of gain) or low disappointment
(for a case of loss) as a result. However, the relationship between the reference point
and the profit received by firm might not be so obvious. Is a low reference point
beneficial to the firm? In reality, we often observe that a firm would make effort on
keeping consumers’ high “expectation” towards its product. For example, through
spending a huge amount on advertisement to promote the product or spending some
expenditures to maintain a good reputation in order to rise the reference point of
consumers. It seems that there is an incentive for a firm to keep a high reference point,
while consumers would prefer a low reference point. Therefore, the questions would
be, firm would prefer a higher or a lower reference point in order to maximize the
profit? Also, accordingly, how would the firm set the price under different levels of
reference point?

They provide the motivation to address these questions. This research proposes a
model of pricing strategies for a firm when it faces reference-dependent consumers.
This research focuses on the following questions including (i) What would be the
pricing strategies for a corresponding reference point? (ii) Firm would prefer a higher
or lower reference point to maximize the profit? (iii) What would be the optimal level
of the reference point and the corresponding pricing strategy when the reference point
can be chosen by the firm? (iv) How to connect the model to real-life situation? This
thesis is organized as follow, section II is the literature review. It includes the
researches which are related to the topic of reference-dependent consumers and pricing
strategies that provide inspirational insights for this thesis. In section III I will present
the proposed model for maximizing the profit received by the firm and the
corresponding price (the optimal pricing strategies) when consumers are referencedependent. The details of the model would be explained in this section. Section VI is
analysis, which includes the contents of deriving the optimal pricing strategies, the
3

optimal demand, and thus the maximized profit using the proposed model, with certain
assumptions be mentioned in this section. Section V is discussion. In this section I will
examine the results with the results shown in the previous section when some
variations are added into the model, such as assuming the reference point is now
endogenously determined. In addition, I will connect the model to the real-life situation
and try to explain the behaviours of firm which are related to the research questions by
considering several scenarios. Lastly, section VI is the conclusion. I would summarize
the results of my research about those findings and the research questions.

II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The model proposed by this study is mainly based on the concept of a reference point,
which was mentioned in the research done by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In their
work, they proposed the prospect theory and the model of reference dependence, which
stated that people usually would consider an outcome as a gain or a loss, rather than
their ultimate personal wealth or welfare. Also, they proposed a concept of lossaversion, which is meant by the utility received by a person would be reduced with a
greater magnitude when facing a loss than the increased utility received when facing
a gain, for the same amount of changes in actual wealth. They illustrated this by
considering a value function, which is concave for the domain of gain while convex
for the domain of loss. The function is steeper in loss domain than gain domain. Later,
there was another research done by Kahneman and Tversky (1991). They presented a
model of reference-dependent theory in their work, which is a theory of consumer
choice and they held the assumption of loss-aversion in their model. For this research,
the concept of loss-aversion would be captured in the model, associated with the
reference point. However, the model presented in this study focuses on firm’s side,
which is related to the optimal price set by a monopoly firm when facing referencedependent consumers.
In addition, Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) proposed a model of reference-dependent
preference, which extended and modified the model proposed by Kahneman and
Tversky. They suggested that the total utility received by a person from a transaction
depends on both “consumption bundle” and “reference bundle”, which refer to an
intrinsic “consumption utility” of the good and “gain-loss utility” that is derived by
4

considering the consumption utility with the reference point. Their research provides
an insight for developing the framework of my research. The model in this study
follows their approach and divides the utility into two parts, such that the total utility
received by a consumer consists of the intrinsic value and the gain-loss utility.
However, instead of focusing on consumer choices, this research would like to study
the firm’s side decision making. This research tries to figure out the optimal prices set
by a firm under different reference point, and the total utility received by a referencedependent consumer would be related to the optimal price. There are several studies
done by some researchers which focus on monopoly and loss-averse consumers. For
example, the work done by Spiegler (2012) assumed that all consumers faced by a
monopoly are loss-averse. It was found that a monopoly firm’s optimal pricing that
causes an unexpected rise in price would reduce consumers’ willingness to pay. This
might suggest that a rise in reference point would reduce the profit received by a model
firm, the intuition is similar to a higher reference point would reduce the “gain-utility”
(or rise “loss-disutility”) to a gain-consumer (or loss-consumer). However, the
dimension of the reference point in my model is different to that of in Spiegler’s (2012)
model. The reference point in my model refers an expectation on the intrinsic value of
good offered by a firm, while Spiegler’s (2012) focused on the expectation on price
(reference price). There was another research done by Heidhues and Kőszegi (2014),
which focused on pricing strategy by a monopolist and loss-averse consumers. It
suggested that consumers’ loss-aversion might lead to an introduction of risk into the
pricing strategies by the firm. In their work, they proposed two sets of pricing strategies
for any degree of loss-aversion of consumers. In my research, there are two sets of
pricing strategies would be proposed. However, those two pricing strategies are based
on the types of consumers faced by a firm. Also, the focus of my research is different
from the work done by Heidhues and Kőszegi (2014). My model focuses on the
optimal pricing strategies for a given level of reference-dependence. I would examine
the resulting profits due to different prices set by the firm, without introducing a risk
into my model. Moreover, Rosato (2016) studied the optimal pricing strategies and
product-availability strategies for a monopoly firm who is facing loss-averse
consumers and selling two goods which are substitutes to each other. In the research,
it was found that the firm could maximize the profit by raising the reference point of
consumers. Rosato’s (2016) research is related to my study in the sense that it was
5

studying the how the reference point could affect the profit received by firm. However,
we have different settings in the model, as Rosato (2016) assumed that the firm is
selling two products which are substitutes to each other, while there is only one product
sold by a firm in my model. However, as Rosato (2016) concluded that raising the
reference point by a firm could maximized the profit received, it is still worth to
examine whether a same conclusion could be drawn in my model, which is now
involves one product sold by firm, rather than two products. This would answer the
research question on firm’s preference of the (exogenously determined) reference
point, based on the assumptions and settings in my research. Also, it seems that those
works were mainly focusing on loss-averse consumers (or some would assume
consumers are loss-averse), instead of considering a monopoly firm which faces both
gain-type and loss-type consumers. This research aims to study the firm’s optimal
price for a given reference point. It is assumed that consumers are reference-dependent,
instead of merely assuming all are loss-averse. Therefore, this research could add some
contributions to the existing literatures which would assume all consumers are lossaverse.

Although this research does not cover the formation of a reference point, it is worth to
take those researches which are related to the formation of the reference point as
reference. It is because they might provide some useful insight for my research to
connect my model to reality. According to literatures, reference point formation is
ambiguous. Also, there were different sources of reference point formation suggested
by different researches. Pesendorfer (2006) even argued that researchers might treat
the reference point as a free variable such that it is chosen to match phenomenon or
behaviors observed. Although Kahneman and Tversky (1979) mentioned the idea of
the reference point, the formation of reference point was not be discussed. Even in the
later study done by Kahneman and Tversky (1991), in which they proposed a theory
of reference-dependent for analyzing consumer’s choice, the formation of reference
point was still not be mentioned. However, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) referred
status quo as a reference point. They stated that a decision maker would consider either
to do nothing or to stick with previous or current decision. In their work, they
conducted a series of experiments to support their view of using status quo as a
reference point. In the experimental research done by Knetsch (1989) which focused
6

on endowment effect, there were some results with experimental evidences which
showed that subjects were loss-averse associated with status quo. Knetsch (1989)
interpreted those results which supported the view of equating the reference point as
status quo. However, in the influential model presented by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006),
the reference point is assumed to be formed by recent expectations. They proposed
that the reference point was a probabilistic belief that a person held recently regarding
the outcomes. They argued that referring status quo as a reference point is based on an
assumption such that people would expect to stay at status quo. However, when there
is a difference between an expectation and the status quo, Kőszegi and Rabin (2006)
would prefer to equate the reference point as an expectation. Ericson and Fuster (2009)
conducted an experimental research, in which they induced expectations exogenously.
Although the focus of their research is associated with endowment effect experiment,
their results supported that the reference point was determined by expectations. In
addition, Baucells et al. (2008) proposed a model with several experiments in a
financial context to study the formation of a reference point and its updating. In their
work, they assumed that the reference point is a function which includes all available
information. This available information is weighted by a function called information
weighting function. Their experimental results showed that the purchased stock price
and the current stock price would receive the highest weighting that affect the
reference price the most. However, there were other researches associated with the
financial context which regarded reference point as a past event. In the research done
by Chen and Rao (2002), they regarded reference point as a stimulus and studied the
change in reference point to explain the phenomenon of surprising reversal. Besides,
Compete and Jehiel (2003) applied an idea of the reference point in their bargaining
model and assumed the reference point is affected by prior offers. However, these
researches which incorporate reference points in their models are context specific. In
spite of context specific, the formation of reference points under different situations
are still ambiguous. Lastly, there was another source of the reference point formation,
which regards the reference point as the first product a consumer had considered. The
research done by Zhou (2012) focused on the implications of consumers’ referencedependence and the impacts on market competition. It was found that when consumers
regard a good, such as the first good they had considered, as a reference point and use
it to evaluate other goods, consumers’ loss-aversion could be observed in such case.
7

This result shows that a reference point can be regarded as a product that a consumer
had considered, and that product might not necessarily be purchased before (i.e. a good
purchased in the past that is not exactly the same). Although in this research I would
not focus on the discussion of the reference point formation, it is worth to understand
various sources of reference point formation such that it might help connecting the
model into reality. In this study, the reference point is regarded as the expectation on
the intrinsic value of good offered by a monopoly firm. Later in the session of
Hotelling competition, the reference point refers to the expectation on the preference
of purchasing the good from a particular firm. It would be explained in details in that
session.

Lastly, the reference point management by the firm is another focus in this research.
The reference point is one of the variables that affects the maximized profit. It would
also affect the optimal price set by firm. Therefore, it is worth to examine how the firm
influences the reference point such that the profit could be maximized. In Karle’s
(2013) research, it was suggested that a firm can influence the willingness to pay of
loss-averse consumers through informative advertising rather than price. Karle (2013)
found that a partial information disclosure by a monopolistic firm would lead to the
greatest consumers’ willingness to pay, which is optimal to the firm. Inspired by the
research of Karle (2013), this study would examine the factors that affect the reference
point, and how those factors would affect the maximized profit received by a firm. It
might answer why sometimes a firm would prefer a certain level of consumers’
expectation towards its product in reality.

III. THE MODEL
Consider a good generates a value 𝑣~𝑈[0,1], where the value 𝑣 represents the intrinsic
value of the good received by a consumer. Consumer receive utility 𝑢 = 𝑣 and they
would only purchase the good as long as 𝑢 ≥ 𝑃, where 𝑃 is the price set by a monopoly
firm. The demand for the good is 𝐷𝑑 = 1 − 𝑣 and thus the profit received by the
monopoly firm 𝜋 = 𝑃 × 𝐷𝑑. As the firm sets an optimal price 𝑃 = 𝑃 ∗ to maximize
profit 𝜋 ∗ . In this case, solving for the optimal price and the corresponding profit, we
have
8

1
2
1
𝐷𝑑∗ =
2
1
𝜋∗ =
2

(1)

𝑃∗ =

(2)
(3)

This is called a “standard model” and (1) is the optimal pricing strategy when the
firm does not consider consumers are reference-dependent. However, when the
reference point 𝜃 ∈ [0,1] is introduced into the model for analysis, the monopoly
firm has to consider its consumers are reference-dependent. The utility function
faced by a single consumer would become

𝑣 + 𝛼(𝑣 − 𝜃)
𝜃
𝑢={
𝑣 − 𝛼𝜆(𝜃 − 𝑣)

𝑖𝑓
𝑖𝑓
𝑖𝑓

𝑣>𝜃
𝑣=𝜃
𝑣<𝜃

(4)

The total utility received by a consumer consists of two parts, the intrinsic value and
the gain-loss utility. For the gain-loss utility, there is a reference-dependent multiplier
0 < 𝛼 < 1 for both of the situations of gain (𝑣 > 𝜃) and loss (𝑣 < 𝜃) faced by a
consumer. Additionally, there is a loss-averse multiplier 𝜆 > 1 for the situation of
loss, due to the assumption that consumers are loss-averse. Under this model, it is
assumed that there are two types of consumers, namely gain-type and loss-type, and a
consumer is either gain-type or loss-type. A gain-type consumer receives the intrinsic
value of the good that is greater than the reference point formed before the purchase is
made, which is represented by 𝑣 > 𝜃 , while a loss-type consumer receives the
intrinsic value that is less than the reference point, which is represented by 𝑣 < 𝜃 . It
is worth to notice that loss-type consumers would still purchase the good from firm as
long as they receive total utility 𝑢 ≥ 𝑃, even if they regard the purchase as a loss, that
is when the intrinsic value of good is less than the reference point formed prior to the
purchase (𝑣 < 𝜃).
The utility function shows that the reference point 𝜃 would only affect the gain-loss
utility, and both of the gain-type consumers and the loss-type consumers would prefer
9

a low 𝜃 as possible because it adds extra gain-loss utility and thus it brings a higher
total utility received by a gain-type consumer as a result. This would be the situation
that is regarded as a “surprise” faced by a gain-type consumer which adds extra utility
received by him, and such “surprise” would be higher when the original expectation
on a product is low, which is 𝜃 is low. It is worth to notice that the term “expectation”
used in this research does not refer to expected value. Instead, it is interchangeable
with “reference point”. However, for loss-type consumer, as the gain-loss utility would
reduce the total utility received, a higher 𝜃 would lead to a higher reduction in total
utility received by a loss-type consumer as a result. This would be the situation such
as a high “disappointment” faced by a loss-type consumer which reduces utility
received by him. The “disappointment” would be higher when that consumer initially
held expectation on the product, which means that the reference point 𝜃 is high. In
other words, the “disappointment” for loss-type would be reduced when 𝜃 is low.
Therefore, both gain-type consumers and loss-type consumers would prefer the
reference point 𝜃 as low as possible in order to receive more total utility. This is the
intuition of low reference point is always preferred by consumers.
The firm sets 𝑃 = 𝑃(𝛼, 𝜃, 𝜆) to maximize the profit 𝜋 = 𝜋(𝑃). The firm can freely set
any price 𝑃 but there might be an optimal pricing strategy which depends on 𝛼, 𝜃
and 𝜆, which would be different from the standard model as (1). The demand faced by
the firm can still be derived by 𝐷𝑑 = 1 − 𝑣, but now 𝐷𝑑 would also depend on 𝛼, 𝜃
and 𝜆, because the derivation of demand involves 𝑃. Therefore, the maximized profit
received by the firm might depend on the price set by monopoly firm which is required
to consider the variables 𝛼, 𝜃 and 𝜆.

The sequence of the purchase:
1. Consumers’ form a reference point 𝜃 towards a good
2. Firm sets a price 𝑃
3. Consumers examine the intrinsic value 𝑣 of the good
4. Consumers refer to the utility function they are facing and make the decision of
purchase if total utility received 𝑢 ≥ 𝑃

10

IV. ANALYSIS
The model defines the two types of consumers faced by the monopoly firm, namely
the gain-type consumer and loss-type consumer. It is assumed that a consumer is either
gain-type consumer or loss-type consumer, depending on the intrinsic value 𝑣 and the
level of reference-dependence 𝜃.

For the monopoly firm who faces the reference-dependent consumers to maximize the
profit, the firm has to consider the demand for the good after the price 𝑃 is set. It is
assumed that the reference point 𝜃 is exogenously determined and the product cost is
zero cost faced by the firm. To derive the demand 𝐷𝑑 corresponding to the price 𝑃 set
by the firm, it is required to consider the critical consumer. The critical consumer is
indifferent from deciding to purchase or not to purchase when the firm sets the price 𝑃,
as this consumer receives zero utility when 𝑢 = 𝑃. The critical consumer gain-type
receives the value, which is

𝑣̂𝐺 =

𝑃 + 𝛼𝜃
1+𝛼

(5)

Similarly, the critical loss-type consumer will receive

𝑣
̂𝐿 =

𝑃 + 𝛼𝜃𝜆
1 + 𝛼𝜆

(6)

Then the demand for good can be derived by 𝐷𝑑 = 1 − 𝑣
̂𝐿 and thus the profit 𝜋 can
be calculated. There are two sets of pricing strategies proposed in this study which are
derived from the utility function in (4), namely gain-type pricing strategy and losstype pricing strategy, based on gain-type consumers and loss-type consumers
respectively. It is worth to notice that when the price is set by the firm, there are only
two cases: (i) the demand consists of gain-type consumers only (all consumers are
gain-type consumers), or (ii) the demand consists of both gain-type consumers and
loss-type consumers. Therefore, the fundamental difference between the gain-type
pricing strategy and loss-type pricing strategy is that, the gain-type pricing strategy
involves serving all gain-type consumers only, while the loss-type pricing strategy
involves serving both gain-type consumers and (some of) loss-type consumers.
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Gain-type Pricing Strategy
This is one of the pricing strategies for a monopoly firm who faces referencedependent consumers. As a consumer is assumed to be either a gain-type consumer or
a loss-type consumer, this pricing strategy refers to the optimal price set by the firm
such that all consumers are gain-type consumers only, for a given level of referencedependence 𝜃. In other words, it is the price when all loss-type consumers are driven
out from the market. Denote 𝑃𝐺 ∈ [0,1] as the price set by firm when the gain-type
pricing strategy is adopted. To find the optimal 𝑃𝐺 = 𝑃𝐺 ∗ , we have to consider the
critical gain-type consumer who receives the total utility 𝑢̂ = 𝑃𝐺 ∗ would receive the
value 𝑣̂𝐺 , that is

𝑣̂𝐺 =

𝑃𝐺 ∗ + 𝛼𝜃
1+𝛼

(7)

Based on (7), we could derive the maximized profit 𝜋𝐺 ∗ , based on the optimal price
𝑃𝐺 ∗ and the demand the firm faced 𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗ = 1 − 𝑣̂,
𝐺 so we have
𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1
2

𝑃𝐺 ∗ =

(8)

Substituting (8) into (7), we can rewrite the critical consumer 𝑣̂𝐺 from (7) and derived
demand 𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗ as

𝑣̂𝐺 =

𝛼 + 𝛼𝜃 + 1
2(1 + 𝛼)

𝐷𝑑 ∗ =

𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1
2(1 + 𝛼)

(9)
(10)

Then, using (8) and (10) to calculate the optimal profit 𝜋𝐺 ∗ , we have

𝜋𝐺

∗

(𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1)2
=
4(1 + 𝛼)
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(11)

From (8), the derivatives of 𝑃𝐺 ∗ with respect to 𝛼 and 𝜃 are
𝑑𝑃𝐺 ∗ 1 − 𝜃
=
𝑑𝛼
2

(12)

𝑑𝑃𝐺 ∗
𝛼
=−
𝑑𝜃
2

(13)

The derivatives show that the optimal gain-type price 𝑃𝐺 ∗ increases as the gain-loss
multiplier 𝛼 increases (

𝑑𝑃𝐺 ∗
𝑑𝛼

> 0) , while 𝑃𝐺 ∗ decreases as the level of reference-

dependence of consumers 𝜃 increases(

𝑑𝑃𝐺 ∗
𝑑𝜃

< 0). The result suggests that the firm

adopts gain-type pricing strategy would set a high price when consumers care more
about the gain-loss utility (𝛼 increases). However, the firm would set a lower price
when the consumers’ reference point towards the product is high (𝜃 increases).The
intuition is that, a higher 𝛼 would bring more gain-utility to a gain-type consumer,
which enables the firm to set a higher price 𝑃𝐺 ∗ , while a higher 𝜃 bring would less
gain-utility to a gain-type consumer, and thus the price has to set a lower price 𝑃𝐺 ∗ .
To take the derivatives of demand 𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗ from (10) with respect to α and θ respectively,
we have
𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗
𝜃
=−
𝑑𝛼
2(𝛼 + 1)2

(14)

𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗
𝛼
=−
𝑑𝜃
2(𝛼 + 1)2

(15)

The derivatives of the demand 𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗ under the optimal gain-type price 𝑃𝐺 ∗ shows that
the demand 𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗
and

𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗
𝑑𝛼

decreases whenever either 𝛼 or 𝜃

increases (

𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗
𝑑𝛼

<0

> 0). These result suggest that the demand for the good decreases when

consumers would care more about the gain-loss utility received for a purchase, or when
consumers would hold a higher expectation (i.e. reference point) towards the good. It
makes sense because a higher reference point would reduce the number of gain-type
consumers in the market (i.e. less consumers face 𝑣 > 𝜃 when 𝜃 increases), so the
monopoly firm who adopts the gain-type pricing strategy (to sever gain-type
13

consumers only) would serve fewer consumers. As a result, the demand faced by the
firm would be lower.
Lastly, for the profit 𝜋𝐺 ∗ from (11), the derivatives of the maximized profit under
gain-type pricing strategy with respect to 𝛼 and 𝜃, would be
𝑑𝜋𝐺 ∗ [(𝜃 − 1)𝛼 − 1][(𝜃 − 1)𝛼 + 2𝜃 − 1]
=
𝑑𝛼
4(𝛼 + 1)2

(16)

𝑑𝜋𝐺 ∗ 𝛼(𝛼𝜃 − 𝛼 − 1)
=
𝑑𝜃
2(𝛼 + 1)

(17)

The derivatives of the profit shows that 𝜋𝐺 ∗ increases as 𝛼 increases (
while 𝜋𝐺 ∗ decreases as 𝜃 increases (

𝑑𝜋𝐺 ∗
𝑑𝜃

𝑑𝜋𝐺 ∗
𝑑𝛼

> 0) ,

< 0) . From (12) and (14), it can be

concluded that the combining effect on profit 𝜋𝐺 ∗ from the increase in price is greater
than that of the decrease in demand, as a result of an increase in gain-loss multiplier,
and thus it increases in profit 𝜋𝐺 ∗ . However, as an increase in reference point would
cause both price and demand to fall, the profit 𝜋𝐺 ∗ would decrease when 𝜃 increases.
The result suggests that when the firm adopts gain-type pricing strategy to set the price,
it would prefer a low reference point 𝜃 formed by consumers.

Loss-type Pricing Strategy
Different from the gain-type pricing strategy set by a monopoly firm such that it serves
gain-type consumers only, the loss-type pricing strategy involves setting the optimal
price by a monopoly that serve both gain-type and some of the loss-type consumers,
when consumers are considered as reference-dependent, for a given level of referencedependence 𝜃. To explain why it is impossible to set a price such that there are losstype consumers only, consider a given 𝜃, the gain-type consumers are those who
face 𝑣 > 𝜃 , and the demand from the gain-type consumers would be 1 − 𝜃 . The losstype consumers face 𝑣 < 𝜃, and the demand from this group of consumers is 𝜃 − 𝑣
̂.
𝐿
Combining them and we would have the total demand 𝐷𝑑𝐿 = 1 − 𝑣
̂.
𝐿 Therefore, when
loss-type pricing strategy is adopted by a monopoly firm to set price 𝑃𝐿 ∗ for a given 𝜃,
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the corresponding demand must include both gain-type consumers and loss-type
consumers.
Considering the firm sets 𝑃 = 𝑃𝐿 , and the critical loss-type consumer who receives the
utility 𝑢̂ = 𝑃𝐿 ∗ would receive the value 𝑣
̂𝐿 , that is
𝑃𝐿 ∗ + 𝛼𝜆𝜃
𝑣
̂𝐿 =
1 + 𝛼𝜆

(18)

As the total demand, which consists of both gain-type consumers and loss-type
∗
consumers, is just 𝐷𝑑𝐿 = 1 − 𝑣
̂.
𝐿 According to (18), the maximized profit 𝜋𝐿 and the

corresponding price 𝑃𝐿 ∗ and demand 𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ could be derived from the corresponding
critical loss-type consumer 𝑣
̂,
𝐿 as shown below:
𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1
2
𝛼𝜆 + 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1
𝑣
̂𝐿 =
2(𝛼𝜆 + 1)

𝑃𝐿 ∗ =

(20)

𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1
2(𝛼𝜆 + 1)

(21)

(𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1)2
4(𝛼𝜆 + 1)

(22)

𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ =
𝜋𝐿 ∗ =

(19)

To examine how would the optimal loss-type price 𝑃𝐿 ∗ , the demand 𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ and
maximized profit 𝜋𝐿 ∗ change with the gain-loss multiplier 𝛼 , the loss-averse
multiplier 𝜆, and the reference point 𝜃, we can take the first-order derivatives for 𝑃𝐿 ∗ ,
𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ and 𝜋𝐿 ∗ with respect to 𝛼, 𝜆 and 𝜃.
The derivatives of the optimal loss-type price 𝑃𝐿 ∗ from (19) with respect to 𝛼, 𝜆 and 𝜃,
would be
𝑑𝑃𝐿 ∗ 𝜆(1 − 𝜃)
=
𝑑𝛼
2
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(23)

𝑑𝑃𝐿 ∗ 𝛼(1 − 𝜃)
=
𝑑𝜆
2

(24)

𝑑𝑃𝐿 ∗
𝛼𝜆
=−
𝑑𝜃
2

(25)

The results of the derivatives of 𝑃𝐿 ∗ with respect to 𝛼, 𝜆 and 𝜃 show that the optimal
price 𝑃𝐿 ∗ increases when either 𝛼 or 𝜆 increases (
decreases when 𝜃 increases (

𝑑𝑃𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝜃

𝑑𝑃𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝛼

> 0 and

𝑑𝑃𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝜆

> 0), while 𝑃𝐿 ∗

< 0). The optimal price PL* will increase when

gain-loss multiplier increases, or when loss-averse multiplier increases. They could be
the cases that the optimal price set by the monopoly firm increases when consumers
care more about their gain-loss utility, which is similar to the result of gain-type pricing
strategy. However, it is worth to mention that different from the gain-type consumer,
the loss-type consumer would receive less utility when the purchase is regarded as loss.
Recall the utility function mentioned in (4), the reduction in the total utility received
by a loss-type consumer (i.e. the term of gain-loss utility −𝛼𝜆(𝜃 − 𝑣)) would be
enlarged when 𝛼 or 𝜆 increases. For the reference point 𝜃, the result is similar to the
gain-type pricing strategy, the optimal price 𝑃𝐿 ∗ decreases reduced when 𝜃 increases.
A higher the reference point 𝜃 would enables the monopoly firm to set a higher price,
as loss-type consumers would receive less disutility for a higher 𝜃.
For the demand 𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ in (21) faced by the firm for adopting loss-type pricing strategy,
the derivatives would be
𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗
𝜆𝜃
=−
𝑑𝛼
2(𝛼𝜆 + 1)2

(26)

𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗
𝛼𝜃
=−
𝑑𝜆
2(𝛼𝜆 + 1)2

(27)

𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗
𝛼𝜆
=−
𝑑𝜃
2(𝛼𝜆 + 1)

(28)

The derivatives of the demand 𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ with respect to 𝛼 , 𝜆 and 𝜃 are all
negative (

𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝛼

< 0,

𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝜆

< 0 and

𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝜃

< 0). The results suggest that the demand

decreases when there is an increase in the gain-loss multiplier 𝛼 , the loss-averse
16

multiplier 𝜆, or the reference point 𝜃. These results are consistent with the results of
the gain-type pricing strategy that taking the derivatives of demand with respect to 𝛼
and 𝜃). As mentioned previously that both 𝛼 and 𝜆 represent the size of the reduction
in the utility received by the loss-type consumers, so it follows that an increase in 𝛼
and 𝜆 will enlarge the effect of reducing utility and thus the demand for good decreases.
Lastly, for the derivatives of the maximized profit 𝜋𝐿 ∗ from (22) with respect to 𝛼, 𝜆
and 𝜃, we have
𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗ 𝜆[(𝜃 − 1)𝛼𝜆 − 1][(𝜃 − 1)𝛼𝜆 + 2𝜃 − 1]
=
𝑑𝛼
4(𝛼𝜆 + 1)2

(29)

𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗ 𝛼[(𝜃 − 1)𝛼𝜆 − 1][(𝜃 − 1)𝛼𝜆 + 2𝜃 − 1]
=
𝑑𝜆
4(𝛼𝜆 + 1)2

(30)

𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗
𝛼𝜆(𝛼𝜆𝜃 − 𝛼𝜆 − 1)
=−
𝑑𝜃
2(𝛼𝜆 + 1)

(31)

The derivatives of the maximized profit 𝜋𝐿 ∗ with respect to the gain-loss multiplier 𝛼
and the loss-averse multiplier 𝜆 are positive (

𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝛼

> 0 and

𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝜆

> 0) , while the

derivatives of the maximized profit 𝜋𝐿 ∗ with respect to the reference point 𝜃 is
negative (

𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝜃

< 0) The result is similar to the gain-type pricing strategy which

suggests that maximized profit increases as 𝛼 increases, while the profit decreases as 𝜃
increases. It could by explain by due to the total demand consists of not only loss-type
consumers but also gain-type consumers, and both loss-type consumers and gain-type
consumers prefer 𝜃 as low as possible.
It is important to highlight that the monopoly firm could set the price 𝑃 freely, for a
given level of reference-dependence 𝜃, which cannot be chosen by the monopoly firm.
The two pricing strategies mentioned above suggest the optimal price set by firm to
maximize for a given 𝜃. For a given 𝜃, the monopoly firm can set any price and decide
to serve only gain-type consumers, or both gain-type and loss-type consumers. The
following tries to find out the optimal price set by firm in three intervals of the level
of reference-dependence 𝜃.
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𝜶+𝟏

When 𝜽 ≤ 𝜶+𝟐
2

Firstly, the maximum 𝜃 = 3 as 0 < 𝛼 < 1. The monopoly firm would maximize the
profit by setting the price 𝑃 = 𝑃𝐺 ∗ using the gain-type pricing strategy and receives
the corresponding profit 𝜋 = 𝜋𝐺 ∗ within this interval. As mentioned in (11), the gaintype pricing strategy, the profit received by the firm is

𝜋𝐺 ∗ =

(𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1)2
4(𝛼 + 1)

To prove that 𝑃𝐺 ∗ is optimal, firstly, consider any price 𝑃 ≠ 𝑃𝐺 ∗ . Assuming 𝑃 = 𝜀𝜃,
where 𝜀 represents the factor that measures the different between the price set by the
monopoly without using the gain-type pricing strategy and the reference point such
𝑃

that 𝜀 = 𝜃 , and we firstly assume that 𝑃 ≠ 𝜃 so 𝜀 ≠ 1. For the price 𝑃 we have the
corresponding critical value for the gain-type consumer 𝑣 =

𝜀𝜃+𝛼𝜃
1+𝛼

. As there is a

𝛼+1

critical value for the reference point 𝜃 = 𝛼+2 within this interval, we would have the
𝛼+𝜀

corresponding 𝑣 = 𝛼+2 and thus the profit

𝜋=

𝜃
𝜀(2 − 𝜀)
𝛼+2

(32)

and we have 0 < 𝜀 < 2. The maximum value for the term 𝜀(2 − 𝜀) = 1 when 𝜀 = 1
(i.e. 𝑃 = 𝜃). As long as 𝜀 ≠ 1, the profit would be less than the case when 𝑃 = 𝜃. It
also shows that, if the price set by the monopoly is different from the reference point
(i.e. 𝜀 ≠ 1) without using the gain-type pricing strategy, the resulting profit received
by the monopoly would be lower than the profit received by using gain-type pricing
𝛼+1

strategy when 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2 for 0 < 𝜀 < 2, i.e. 𝜋 < 𝜋𝐺 ∗ for 𝑃 ≠ 𝑃𝐺 ∗ . If we just consider
0 < 𝜀 < 1, it at least ensures that any price 𝑃 ≠ 𝑃𝐺 ∗ and 𝑃 < 𝜃 will not maximize
profit.
So, what if 𝑃 > 𝜃 (and 1 < 𝜀 < 2 )? Firstly, it could be true that 𝑃𝐺 ∗ ≥ 𝜃 such
that

𝑃𝐺 ∗
𝜃

𝛼+1

< 2 for 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2. However, excluding the cases for 𝑃𝐺 ∗ and for 𝜀 < 2, any
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price 𝑃 > 𝜃 but 𝑃 ≠ 𝑃𝐺 ∗ would generate the corresponding profit 𝜋 < 𝜋𝐺 ∗ . Also, all
of the loss-type consumers will be driven out from the market when 𝑃 > 𝜃 for this
interval. That means, there are only gain-type consumers. When the firm is facing
gain-type consumers, for a given reference point 𝜃, setting 𝑃 = 𝑃𝐺 ∗ would generate the
maximized profit 𝜋𝐺 ∗ . It is worth to notice that (12) does not include the price as a
variable, which implies that the maximized profit does not depend on the price set by
firm, but 𝛼 and 𝜃 instead. It means that, for 𝑃 > 𝜃 , as there are only gain-type
consumers served by the monopoly firm, the maximized profit will be just equal
to 𝜋𝐺 ∗ .
𝜃

For 𝑃 = 𝜃 , considering 𝜋 = 𝛼+2 𝜀(2 − 𝜀) . As 𝜀 = 1 , the maximum profit would
𝜃

be 𝜋 = 𝛼+2 . It shows that the profit 𝜋 increases as 𝜋𝜃 increases. However, as the
𝛼+1

𝜃

reference point is at most 𝜋 = 𝛼+2 for this interval, the maximum 𝜋 = 𝛼+2 𝜀(2 − 𝜀)
can be written as
𝜋=

𝛼+1
𝛼+2

(33)

𝛼+1

1

assuming 𝛼 = 0, the maximum value would be 𝜋 = (𝛼+2)2 = 4 . As 0 < 𝛼 < 1, the
2 1

range for profit 𝜋 ⊂ (9 , 4). In fact, the profit can also be written as 𝜋 = 𝑃 × (1 −
𝑃+𝛼𝜃
1+𝛼

). As 𝑃 = 𝜃, we would have 𝑣 = 𝜃 and 𝜋 = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) = 𝑃(1 − 𝑃) = 𝑣(1 − 𝑣).

It becomes the standard model mentioned previously and the maximum profit received
1

would be just 4. However, when we compare this profit 𝜋 with the maximized profit
by using gain-type pricing strategy 𝜋𝐺 ∗ , as long as 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1, we would have

1
4

≤

1

𝜋𝐺 ∗ ≤ 2. Therefore, the above analysis shows that any price 𝑃 ≠ 𝑃𝐺 ∗ would generate
the corresponding profit 𝜋 < 𝜋𝐺 ∗ . In other words, the gain-type pricing strategy would
𝛼+1

maximize the profit received by the monopoly firm for 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2.
For the loss-type pricing strategy, using the approach mentioned above directly cannot
derive the profit received by the firm correctly because we would have the intrinsic
value received all of the consumers 𝑣 ≥ 𝜃 (i.e. no loss-type consumers) under this
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interval 𝜃 ≤

𝛼+1

. The loss-type price 𝑃𝐿 ∗ would give the value received by the critical

𝛼+2

loss-type consumer 𝑣
̂𝐿 > 𝜃 if we follow the analytical framework under loss-type
pricing strategy to find 𝑃𝐿 ∗ and the corresponding 𝜋𝐿 ∗ directly using (19) and (22). The
result would be inaccurate as it violates the assumption of the loss-type pricing strategy
such that there would are no consumers face the intrinsic value 𝑣 < 𝜃. In fact the
monopoly firm could set the price such that there are loss-type consumers for the price
𝛼+1

when 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2, but the profit of serving the loss-type consumers (together with gaintype consumers) would be strictly lower than 𝜋𝐺 ∗ , as proved above any price P ≠ 𝑃𝐺 ∗
would generate the corresponding 𝜋 < 𝜋𝐺 ∗ .
In short, the monopoly firm can maximize the profit by setting the using the gain-type
pricing strategy when facing reference-dependent consumers when the level of
𝛼+1

reference-dependence falls within 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2.
𝜶𝝀+𝟏

When 𝜽 ≥ 𝜶𝝀+𝟐
The monopoly firm would maximize the profit by setting the price 𝑃 = 𝑃𝐿 ∗ using the
loss-type pricing strategy and receives the corresponding profit 𝜋 = 𝜋𝐿 ∗ within this
interval. As mentioned in (18), we have the value received by the critical loss-type
consumer such that

𝑣
̂𝐿 =

𝑃𝐿 ∗ + 𝛼𝜆𝜃
1 + 𝛼𝜆

It assumes that the critical consumer is the loss-type consumer who faces 𝑣
̂𝐿 ≤ 𝜃.
If 𝑃𝐿 ∗ = 𝜃, then the critical loss-type consumer faces 𝑣
̂𝐿 = 𝑃𝐿 ∗ = 𝜃. To prove that
𝑃𝐿 ∗ is optimal, consider any price 𝑃 ≠ 𝑃𝐿 ∗ .When 𝑃 > 𝜃 all loss-type consumers are
driven out from the market, as none of them face the value 𝑣 < 𝜃 but at the same would
purchase from the shop because of the total utility received 𝑢 ≥ 𝑃. As there is no losstype consumer in the market, all consumers are gain-type consumers. In this case, the
corresponding profit 𝜋 is derived by consider the price 𝑃 > 𝜃, and the demand (1 −
𝑣𝐺 ). However, the profit 𝜋 is strictly less than 𝜋𝐿 ∗ . That is,
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(𝛼𝜆−𝛼𝜆𝜃+1)2
4(𝛼𝜆+1)

> 𝑃(1 −

𝑃+𝛼𝜃
𝛼+1

), where 𝑃 > 𝜃. As the higher price 𝑃 > 𝜃 would even reduce more demand of

gain-type consumers.
𝛼𝜆+1

𝛼𝜆+1

𝛼𝜆+1

When 𝑃 = 𝜃 , the profit 𝜋 = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) = 𝛼𝜆+2 (1 − 𝛼𝜆+2) = (𝛼𝜆+2)2 . Also, the
𝑑𝜋

derivative of 𝜋 = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) with respect to 𝜃 is 𝑑𝜃 = 1 − 2𝜃. As the highest 𝜃 for this
𝛼𝜆+1

1

interval is 𝜃 = 𝛼𝜆+2, the reference point 𝜃 > 2 as long as 0 < 𝛼 < 1 and 𝜆 > 1. So,
𝑑𝜋

we would have 𝑑𝜃 < 0 . For the maximized loss-type profit 𝜋𝐿 ∗ =
𝛼𝜆+1

(𝛼𝜆−𝛼𝜆𝜃+1)2
4(𝛼𝜆+1)

=

𝛼𝜆+1

(𝛼𝜆+2)2

when𝜃 = 𝛼𝜆+2. Therefore, when 𝑃 = 𝜃, the profit 𝜋 = 𝜋𝐿 ∗ as 𝑃𝐿 ∗ = 𝜃 at 𝜃 =

𝛼𝜆+1

. The derivative of maximized loss-type profits 𝜋𝐿 ∗ with respect to the reference

𝛼𝜆+2

point𝜃 is shown in (31) is negative (
𝑑𝜋

0, and it is found that 𝑑𝜃 >

𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝜃

𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝜃

< 0). Although we have

𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝜃

< 0 and

𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝜃

<

. Additionally, as we have 𝜋 = 𝜋𝐿 ∗ , we could claim

that setting price 𝑃 = 𝜃 and loss type pricing strategy would generate the same profit
𝛼𝜆+1

𝛼𝜆+1

𝛼𝜆+1

for 𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2 when 𝜃 = 𝛼𝜆+2, but as 𝜃 > 𝛼𝜆+2, the maximized profit by adopting loss𝛼𝜆+1

type pricing strategy is higher than setting 𝑃 = 𝜃 (i.e. 𝜋𝐿 ∗ > 𝜋 for 𝜃 > 𝛼𝜆+2).
When 𝑃 ≠ 𝑃𝐿 ∗ and 𝑃 < 𝜃, there are both gain-type and loss-type consumers in the
market. To derive the optimal pricing strategy, it would returns to the loss-type pricing
strategy as mentioned previously, at a given reference point 𝜃. Therefore, for any price
P < 𝜃 and 𝑃 ≠ 𝑃𝐿 ∗ , the profit 𝜋 < 𝜋𝐿 ∗ .
For

gain-type

pricing

strategy,

as

the

level

of

reference-dependence

𝛼𝜆+1

is high 𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2, the value faced by the critical gain-type consumer is 𝑣̂𝐺 < 𝜃, which
is less the reference point. However, it violates the assumption of the gain-type pricing
strategy. Therefore, using the gain-type strategy to derive the profit directly would
receive an incorrect result. As mentioned that when 𝑃 > 𝜃, there are only gain-type
𝛼𝜆+1

consumers, however, considering (9), when 𝜃 is high (𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2) , the gain-type
pricing strategy is no applicable. It is true that the profit can be derived for the firm
serves only gain-type consumer 𝑃 > 𝜃 in this interval. The resulting profit would be
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strictly less then profit generated by loss-type pricing strategy (𝜋 < 𝜋𝐿 ∗ ) as
mentioned above.

In short, the monopoly firm can maximize the profit by setting the using the loss-type
pricing strategy when facing reference-dependent consumers when the level of
𝛼𝜆+1

reference-dependence equals to 𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2.
𝜶+𝟏

𝜶𝝀+𝟏

When 𝜶+𝟐 ≤ 𝜽 ≤ 𝜶𝝀+𝟐
As long as the loss-averse multiplier 𝜆 > 1, there is an interval for the reference
𝛼+1

𝛼𝜆+1

point 𝛼+2 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2. For this interval, as mentioned previously that the gain-type
pricing strategy and the loss-type pricing strategy will give an inaccurate result for
deriving the maximized profits 𝜋𝐺 ∗ and

𝛼𝜆+1

𝜋𝐿 ∗ for 𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2 and

𝛼+1

𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2

respectively. The optimal pricing strategy for a monopoly firm is to set the price equals
to the reference point 𝜃 and thus the profit 𝜋𝜃 ∗ would be maximized when

𝛼+1
𝛼+2

≤𝜃≤

𝛼𝜆+1
𝛼𝜆+2

𝛼+1

To prove that profit 𝜋𝜃 ∗ is maximized when monopoly firm sets 𝑃𝜃 = 𝜃 for 𝛼+2 ≤ 𝜃 ≤
𝛼𝜆+1

𝑃+𝛼𝜃

𝛼𝜆+2

1+𝛼

. Considering the value received by the critical gain-type consumer 𝑣̂𝐺 =

=,

when 𝑃 = 𝜃, this critical gain-type consumer receives ̂
𝑣𝐺 = 𝑃 = 𝜃. For a critical losstype consumer 𝑣
̂𝐿 =

𝑃+𝛼𝜆𝜃
1+𝛼𝜆

, this consumer would receive 𝑣
̂𝐿 = 𝑃 = 𝜃 when 𝑃 = 𝜃.

When the firm sets a price 𝑃 ≠ 𝑃 and 𝑃 < 𝜃, as the threshold for a critical consumer
to purchase 𝑣̂ is reduced, there would be more loss-type consumer (i.e. demand
increases), and the profit for the price 𝑃 < 𝜃 would generate the profit 𝜋 = 𝑃(1 −
𝑃+𝛼𝜆𝜃
1+𝛼𝜆

) where 𝑃 < 𝜃 , but this profit 𝜋 < 𝜋𝜃 ∗ . It is worth to notice that the value

received by the critical gain-type consumer would be ̂
𝑣𝐺 < 𝜃 so it would be inaccurate
to derive the profit 𝜋 by considering the firm is facing the demand equals to 1 − ̂
𝑣𝐺
instead of 1 − ̂
𝑣𝐿 for 𝑃 < 𝜃. Similarly, if the firm sets a price 𝑃 ≠ 𝑃 and 𝑃 > 𝜃, as
the threshold for a critical consumer to purchase 𝑣̂ is increased, there will be no loss-
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type consumers (as ̂
𝑣𝐿 > 𝜃). Therefore, the profit 𝜋 = 𝑃(1 −

𝑃+𝛼𝜃
1+𝛼

) where 𝑃 > 𝜃,

but this profit 𝜋 < 𝜋𝜃 ∗ .
Therefore, the optimal price, and the corresponding demand and thus the profit,
𝛼+1

𝛼𝜆+1

when 𝛼+2 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2, would be
𝑃𝜃 ∗ = 𝜃

(34)

𝐷𝑑𝜃 ∗ = 1 − 𝜃

(35)

𝜋𝜃 ∗ = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃)

(36)

The derivatives for the price 𝑃𝜃 ∗ and profit 𝜋𝜃 ∗ under this pricing strategy are simply
1 and 1 − 2𝜃. For the derivative of 𝜋𝜃 ∗ with respect to 𝜃 (
𝛼+1

𝑑𝜋𝜃 ∗
𝑑𝜃

= 1 − 2𝜃) is negative

𝛼𝜆+1

because of the condition 𝛼+2 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2 and 0 < 𝛼 < 1. That is, for any 0 < 𝛼 < 1
and the condition for this pricing strategy
1

𝛼+1
𝛼+2

𝛼𝜆+1

≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2 such that profit 𝜋𝜃 ∗ =

𝜃(1 − 𝜃), it can be found that 𝜃 ≥ 2 . It follows that

𝑑𝜋𝜃 ∗
𝑑𝜃

< 0. Different from the

pricing strategies mentioned previously, this pricing strategy involves setting a higher
price as there is an increase in reference point 𝜃. However, it is same as those pricing
strategies that the profit would be reduced as 𝜃 increases.

In short, when

𝛼+1
𝛼+2

𝛼𝜆+1

≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2 where using both gain-type pricing and loss-type

pricing strategies to derive the corresponding profit will be inaccurate, the maximized
profit received by the monopoly firm is 𝜋𝜃 ∗ as long as the firm sets the price as
𝑃𝜃 ∗ = 𝜃.
To sum up, for a given 𝜃, considering the optimal price for all of the three intervals of
𝛼+1

reference point 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2 ,

𝛼+1
𝛼+2

𝛼𝜆+1

𝛼𝜆+1

monopoly firm could maximize the profit by setting price 𝑃 = 𝑃𝐺 ∗ . When
𝛼𝜆+1
𝛼𝜆+2

𝛼+1

≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2 and 𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2 . When 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2 , the
𝛼+1
𝛼+2

≤𝜃≤

, the monopoly firm could maximize the profit by setting price 𝑃 = 𝑃𝜃 ∗ = 𝜃.

When 𝜃 ≤

𝛼+1

, the monopoly firm could maximize the profit by setting price 𝑃 = 𝑃𝐿 ∗ .

𝛼+2
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𝛼+1

Any price other than 𝑃 = 𝑃𝐺 ∗ for 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2 , 𝑃 = 𝑃𝜃 ∗ for

𝛼+1

𝛼𝜆+1

≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2 , and 𝑃 =
𝛼+2

𝛼𝜆+1

𝑃𝐿 ∗ for 𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2 would generate less profit to the monopoly firm. Therefore, there is
a theorem for a monopoly firm to maximize profit by setting the optimal price.

Theorem 1: a monopoly firm who is facing reference-dependent consumers
𝛼+1

maximizes its profit by setting the optimal price 𝑃 = 𝑃𝐺 ∗ for 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2 , 𝑃 = 𝑃𝜃 ∗ = 𝜃
for

𝛼+1
𝛼+2

𝛼𝜆+1

𝛼𝜆+1

≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2, and 𝑃 = 𝑃𝐿 ∗ for 𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2.

Combining those previous results which maximize the profit received by the monopoly
firm when an exogenously determined reference point 𝜃 falls into different intervals,
given that consumers are reference-dependent, we can conclude that
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𝑃𝐺 ∗
𝑃 ∗ = 𝑃𝜃 ∗ = 𝜃
𝑃𝐿 ∗

{

𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑜𝑟

𝛼+1
𝛼+2
𝛼+1
𝛼𝜆 + 1
≤𝜃≤
𝛼+2
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝛼𝜆 + 1
𝜃≥
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝜃≤

(37)

For a given 𝜃, any price set by the monopoly firm other than 𝑃∗ as in (37) would
generate less than the profit. To summarize the profit corresponding to the optimal
price set by the monopoly firm under those three intervals of θ as mentioned in (37),
we have

𝜋𝐺 ∗ =
𝜋∗ =

(𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1)2
4(𝛼 + 1)

𝜋𝜃 ∗ = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃)
{

𝜋𝐿 ∗ =

(𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1)2
4(𝛼𝜆 + 1)

𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑜𝑟

𝛼+1
𝛼+2
𝛼+1
𝛼𝜆 + 1
≤𝜃≤
𝛼+2
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝛼𝜆 + 1
𝜃≥
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝜃≤

(38)

As we are interested in studying how would the profit change as the reference point 𝜃
increases, taking the derivatives of profits from (38) with respect to 𝜃, we have
𝑑𝜋𝐺 ∗ 𝛼(𝛼𝜃 − 𝛼 + 1)
=
𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑑𝜃
2(𝛼 + 1)
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝜋𝜃 ∗
=
= 1 − 2𝜃
𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑑𝜃
𝑑𝜃
𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗ 𝛼𝜆(𝛼𝜆𝜃 − 𝛼𝜆 + 1)
=
𝑓𝑜𝑟
2(𝛼𝜆 + 1)
{ 𝑑𝜃

𝛼+1
𝛼+2
𝛼+1
𝛼𝜆 + 1
≤𝜃≤
𝛼+2
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝛼𝜆 + 1
𝜃≥
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝜃≤

It shows that those three derivatives are all negative with respect to 𝜃 (
𝑑𝜋𝜃 ∗
𝑑𝜃

< 0 and

𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗
𝑑𝜃

(39)

𝑑𝜋𝐺 ∗
𝑑𝜃

<0,

< 0). It is worth to mention that 𝜋𝐺 ∗′′ < 𝜋𝐿 ∗′′ so 𝜋 ∗ decreases at a
𝛼𝜆+1

𝛼+1

faster rate when 𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2 than when 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2. It implies consumers’ loss-aversion and
𝛼+1

it is captured by the loss-averse multiplier 𝜆. In addition, at the critical point 𝜃 = 𝛼+2,
𝛼𝜆+1

it is found that 𝜋𝐺 ∗ = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) = 𝜋𝜃 ∗ . Similarly, at another critical point 𝜃 = 𝛼𝜆+2
it is found that 𝜋𝐿 ∗ = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) = 𝜋𝜃 ∗ . Therefore, according to these results, the
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optimal profit mentioned (38) is a continuous and monotonic decreasing function with
respect to 𝜃. Additionally, we could conclude that (i) 𝜋𝐺 ∗ (𝜃1 ) ≥ 𝜋𝜃 ∗ (𝜃2 ) ≥ 𝜋𝐿 ∗ (𝜃3 )
𝛼+1 𝛼+1

for 𝜃1 ≤ 𝜃2 ≤ 𝜃3 but𝜃1 < 3, where 𝜃1 ≤ 𝛼+2,

𝛼+2

𝛼𝜆+1

𝛼𝜆+1

≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2 and 𝜃3 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2; and (ii)

𝜋𝐺 ∗ (𝜃1 ) = 𝜋𝜃 ∗ (𝜃2 ) only when 𝜃1 = 𝜃2 , and 𝜋𝜃 ∗ (𝜃2 ) ≥ 𝜋𝐿 ∗ (𝜃3 ) only when 𝜃2 = 𝜃3 .
V.

DISCUSSION

When Reference Point is Endogenously Determined
When the reference point 𝜃 is not exogenous determined, which means that the
monopoly firm can now influence and control the reference point 𝜃 to maximize the
profit. It is found that when the reference point 𝜃 is exogenously determined, the
maximized profit would be shown in (38) and the derivatives with respect to the
reference point 𝜃 as shown in (39) are all negative. These results show that firm would
prefer to have the reference point 𝜃 as low as possible when 𝜃 is exogenously
determined. When 𝜃 is endogenously determined by the monopoly firm, it would be a
corollary that the firm would choose the lowest 𝜃. For that 𝜃 chosen by firm, the
optimal price, corresponding demand and the maximize profit would be same as
covered in the previous content where 𝜃 is exogenously determined, as they are
derived based on a given 𝜃.

Selling Cost
The result suggests that the firm would receive higher maximized profit for a lower
the reference point /theta. However, there are situations in which a firm may choose a
higher reference point. To illustrate this point, consider a selling cost faced by the
monopoly firm. For example, it is a cost spent by firm to maintain its reputation so that
those retailers would be willing to sell the products offered by a monopoly, or it could
be a cost for promoting the products such that more consumers would know, or even
refer the product to others. The selling cost and the reference point θ are positively
related. The model presented previously assumes there is a zero production cost faced
by the firm. This assumption is still held for the following discussion. However, a
selling cost would be introduced to explain the firm’s behavior of keeping a high
reference point by consumers, instead of a low reference point.
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Considering a selling cost 𝑐 = 𝑐(𝜃), which is a function of reference point such
that 𝑐 ′ (𝜃) < 0 and 𝑐 ′′ (𝜃) < 0. The selling cost is a decreasing function with respect
to reference point 𝜃. The selling cost is assumed to be a lump sum cost instead of
proportionate to the size of demand. It is assumed that this amount could not be
avoided by firm. For example, if we consider this selling cost as a cost faced by a
monopoly to maintain a good reputation otherwise those retailers would not sell those
products in their stores. If the reference point is low, a monopoly firm has to spend
more such that to have a good reputation by consumers. However, the effect of such
promotion activities on maintaining reputation would be diminished as 𝜃 increases.
Therefore, the selling cost is a decreasing function with respect to reference point such
that 𝑐 ′ (𝜃) < 0 and 𝑐 ′′ (𝜃) < 0 . In addition, consumers could help promoting the
product through various platforms when the reference point is high. Consumers would
be more willing to refer a product to others, if the product comes from the firm which
has a good reputation in market. It might be related to network externality but it would
not be covered in the model in this research. Despite of this, holding this assumption,
the network externality could cause the firm to spend even less as a selling when the
reference point is high such that 𝑐 ′′ (𝜃) < 0.
Therefore, with an introduction of the selling cost, the “profit” in (38) now becomes
the “revenue” received by the firm. Considering (38) and 𝑐 = 𝑐(𝜃), the new profit with
selling cost 𝜋𝐶 received by the firm becomes

𝜋𝑐𝐺
𝜋𝐶 ∗ =

∗

(𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1)2
=
− 𝑐(𝜃)
4(𝛼 + 1)

𝜋𝑐𝜃 ∗ = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) − 𝑐(𝜃)
{

𝜋𝑐𝐿 ∗ =

𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑜𝑟

(𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1)2
− 𝑐(𝜃) 𝑓𝑜𝑟
4(𝛼𝜆 + 1)

𝛼+1
𝛼+2
𝛼+1
𝛼𝜆 + 1
≤𝜃≤
𝛼+2
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝛼𝜆 + 1
𝜃≥
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝜃≤

𝛼𝜆+1

(40)

𝛼+1

It is mentioned in (39) that the function π is steeper when 𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2 than when 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2.
𝛼+1

𝛼𝜆+1

It implies that 𝜋𝐺 ∗ (𝜃1 ) ≥ 𝜋𝐿 ∗ (𝜃2 ), where 𝜃1 < 𝜃2 and 𝜃1 ≤ 𝛼+2, 𝜃2 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2. However,
with an introduction of the selling cost 𝑐 such that such that 𝑐 ′ (𝜃) < 0 and 𝑐 ′′ (𝜃) < 0,
it is possible that 𝜋𝑐𝐺 ∗ < 𝜋𝑐𝐿 ∗ when 𝜃 is sufficiently high. That is, 𝜋𝑐𝐺 ∗ (𝜃1 , 𝑐(𝜃1 )) <
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𝛼+1

𝛼𝜆+1

𝜋𝑐𝐿 ∗ (𝜃2 , 𝑐(𝜃2 )), where 𝜃1 < 𝜃2 and 𝜃1 ≤ 𝛼+2, 𝜃2 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2. Depending on the selling
cost function 𝑐 = 𝑐(𝜃), if 𝑐(𝜃) is sufficiently high at 𝜃 = 0 and 𝑐 ′′ > 𝜋 ′′ , then it is
possible to have

𝑑𝜋𝑐

> 0 for certain level of reference-dependence 𝜃. As a result, it

𝑑𝜃

will give 𝜋𝑐𝐺 ∗ < 𝜋𝑐𝐿 ∗ and thus this could explain in reality a monopoly firm could
receive more profit when the level of reference-dependence 𝜃 is not the lowest.
Therefore, if the reference point 𝜃 is endogenously determined by the monopoly firm,
it would not always prefer the lowest reference point 𝜃. It is because setting the price
according to the lowest possible reference point 𝜃 would not always guarantee
generating highest maximized profit. The optimal reference point 𝜃 would depend on
the properties of the selling cost function 𝑐(𝜃), that is 𝑐 ′ (𝜃) < 0 and 𝑐 ′′ (𝜃) < 0. In
addition, if there is an inflection point such that 𝑐 ′′ (𝜃) < 0 becomes 𝑐 ′′ (𝜃) > 0. The
inflection point might be resulting from an ineffective advertising strategy. As a result,
it might create an optimal point for 𝜋𝑐 (a local maximum). In this case, there would be
an optimal reference point 𝜃, which is a target 𝜃 for firm. For example, if the monopoly
firm knows 𝜋𝑐 for each 𝜃 and 𝜃 can be determined by firm. Firm could receive the
optimal maximized profit by choosing 𝜃 and spend corresponding the selling cost for
this 𝜃. Therefore, the selling cost might be one of the possibilities that firm could
receive higher profit under a certain level of consumers’ reference point, instead of a
lowest possible reference point (or even 𝜃 = 0).

Participation Cost
I next consider a situation in which a consumer incurs a participation cost when
inspecting the good. Assuming a consumer would participate only if the consumer has
a certain extend of expectation of purchasing a high-value product, which could be
regarded as a high reference point 𝜃 towards the product. In other words, when the
reference point 𝜃 is high, the participation rate of consumers would be high, so the
demand would be high. When 𝜃 is low, those with high participation cost would drop
out, so demand would decrease. Therefore, the total demand for the product would
decrease when 𝜃 decreases. It is found that demand is a decreasing function with
′

𝛼+1

′

𝛼𝜆+1

respect to 𝜃 and 𝐷𝑑∗ (𝜃𝐿 ) < 𝐷𝑑 ∗ (𝜃𝐻 ), where 𝜃𝐿 < 𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿 ≤ 𝛼+2 and 𝜃𝐻 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2.
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Considering there are 𝑛 potential consumers and each of them has to face their inspect
cost. However, the inspect costs are different for each consumer, assuming the inspect
cost follows the uniform distribution, for example, the nth person faces 𝑛 units of cost,
the n-1th one faces 𝑛 − 1 units of cost, and so on. As mentioned that consumers would
only purchase the product after inspecting it, and they would inspect the product only
when it is expected to be valuable (i.e. when 𝜃 is sufficiently high). Consumer would
then compare the total utility received with the inspect cost and price they faced. When
𝜃 decreases, consumers with high inspect cost will drop out because the inspect cost
is too high such that adding the inspect cost to price of good would exceed the total
utility they received from purchasing it.
Denotes 𝜇(𝑛) as the participation cost function, which is the function of 𝑛 as it
represents the units of the participation cost for each consumer and each consumer has
different 𝑛. Consumers’ purchase decision involves considering 𝑢(𝜃) ≥ 𝑃(𝜃) + 𝜇(𝑛).
For certain level of reference point 𝜃 that consumers are facing their corresponding
participation cost with function 𝜇(𝑛), consumers would still purchase the product as
long as 𝑢 ≥ 𝑃 + 𝜇 . It is mentioned that consumers would prefer low 𝜃 as possible
such that

𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝜃

< 0 and it is shown that

𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝜃

< 0 . With the new participation cost

function 𝜇(𝑛), the critical consumer would receive total utility 𝑢 = 𝑃 + 𝜇. However,
I would firstly not to derive the result by considering the critical consumer at 𝑢 = 𝑃 +
𝜇. Instead, I would consider the participation cost which would directly affect the total
demand only.
Considering a new total demand function which includes another component 𝑟(𝜃),
where 𝑟(𝜃) represents the reduction in demand as a result of a change in reference
point 𝜃. It is because as 𝜃 decreases, and some consumers with high participation cost
would drop out. Therefore, 𝑟(𝜃) is a function of the reference point 𝜃 such that the
new total demand now becomes 𝐷𝑑 − 𝑟(𝜃) . In addition, the demand would be
decreased at a decreasing rate with respect to 𝜃. Given that the price of good set by
firm remains unchanged, as assumed that the optimal price of good is not set based
on 𝑢 = 𝑃 + 𝜇, and the participation cost would only affect the total demand. That is,
the participation cost is not part of a consideration for a monopoly firm to set its price,
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but it would in fact affect the demand for good. It can be considered as a situation that
consumers has certain threshold for the reference point such that they would put an
effort in inspecting a good if the reference point is at least higher than the threshold,
but such threshold would not be considered by a monopoly firm in setting the price of
good. There would be two opposite forces, (i) firm prefers a low reference point 𝜃
because the profit would decrease as 𝜃 increases, but at the same time (ii) a low 𝜃
would reduce the total demand for a good when consumers are facing the participation
cost. Therefore, there would be an optimal 𝜃 such that the firm would no longer prefer
the lowest possible 𝜃 , or even 𝜃 = 0 , as a low reference point leads to a low
participation rate.
Now considering the situation if a monopoly firm would consider consumers’
participation cost when setting the price of a good. Denote this version of participation
cost as 𝑖. Therefore, this participation cost would not only affect the total demand, but
also the price and the profit. The firm has to consider consumers’ total utility received
versus the cost they faced. So, consumers would purchase as long as 𝑢 ≥ 𝑃 + 𝑖. As the
level of reference point 𝜃 is assumed to be exogenously determined, the following
analysis includes the effect of participation cost 𝑖 on the optimal price, the total
demand and the corresponding profit for all three intervals as mentioned previously.
The aim is to show the effect of the introduction of the participation cost on demand
and profit, when the monopoly firm consider consumers’ participation cost when set a
price, for a given level of reference-dependence. Consumers would now purchase the
product only if 𝑢 − 𝑖 ≥ 𝑃. Using the approach of finding the critical gain-type and
loss-type consumers and derive the corresponding optimal price, the demand, as well
as the profit as mentioned previously, we would have

𝑃𝐺 ∗ =

𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1 𝑖
−
2
2

𝑃𝜃 ∗ = 𝜃 − 𝑖

𝑃=
∗
{𝑃𝐿 =

𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑜𝑟

𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1 𝑖
−
𝑓𝑜𝑟
2
2
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𝛼+1
𝛼+2
𝛼+1
𝛼𝜆 + 1
≤𝜃≤
𝛼+2
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝛼𝜆 + 1
𝜃≥
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝜃≤

(41)

𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗ =

𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1
𝑖
−
2(𝛼 + 1)
2(𝛼 + 1)

𝑓𝑜𝑟

𝐷𝑑𝜃 ∗ = 1 − 𝜃 + 𝑖

𝐷𝑑 =
𝐷𝑑 ∗ =
{ 𝐿

𝜋𝐺 ∗ =

𝑓𝑜𝑟

𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1
𝑖
−
𝑓𝑜𝑟
2(𝛼𝜆 + 1)
2(𝛼𝜆 + 1)

(𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1)2 𝑖 2 + 2𝛼𝜃𝑖 − 2𝛼𝑖 − 2𝑖
+
4(𝛼 + 1)
4(𝛼 + 1)
𝜋𝜃 ∗ = (𝜃 − 𝑖) − (𝜃 − 𝑖)2

𝜋=
𝜋 ∗=
{ 𝐿

𝛼+1
𝛼+2
𝛼+1
𝛼𝜆 + 1
≤𝜃≤
𝛼+2
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝛼𝜆 + 1
𝜃≥
𝛼𝜆 + 2

𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑜𝑟

(𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1)2 𝑖 2 + 2𝛼𝜆𝜃𝑖 − 2𝛼𝜆𝑖 − 2𝑖
+
4(𝛼𝜆 + 1)
4(𝛼𝜆 + 1)

𝑓𝑜𝑟

𝜃≤

𝛼+1
𝛼+2
𝛼+1
𝛼𝜆 + 1
≤𝜃≤
𝛼+2
𝛼𝜆 + 2
𝛼𝜆 + 1
𝜃≥
𝛼𝜆 + 2

(42)

𝜃≤

(43)

There is an interesting result, the effect of the participation cost on reducing the
𝛼+1

demand when the reference point is low (𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2) is greater than that of the situation
𝛼𝜆+1

𝑖

when the reference point is high (𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2), as shown in (42) and we have 2(𝛼+1) >
𝑖

. In addition, both of the
2(𝛼𝜆+1)

𝑖 2 +2𝛼𝜃𝑖−2𝛼𝑖−2𝑖
4(𝛼+1)

for 𝜋𝐺 ∗ and

𝑖 2 +2𝛼𝜆𝜃𝑖−2𝛼𝜆𝑖−2𝑖
4(𝛼𝜆+1)

for 𝜋𝐿 ∗ are

increasing functions, although they are both negative for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1]. It is also worth to
mention that the profit 𝜋 = (𝜃 − 𝑖) − (𝜃 − 𝑖)2 is increasing for

𝛼+1
𝛼+2

𝛼𝜆+1

≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2 .

As 𝜋𝐿 ∗ is a decreasing function, there is a new local maximum for the profit function
𝛼𝜆+1

(43) at 𝜃 = 𝛼𝜆+2 for 𝜃 ∈ [0,1]. The result suggests that when there is an existence of
the participation cost, a monopoly firm would not prefer a lowest possible level of
reference dependence. If the reference point 𝜃 can be chosen by firm, then setting the
price by adopting gain-type pricing strategy (with 𝜃 = 0) would not be optimal, as
𝛼𝜆+1

there is a new local maximum at 𝜃 = 𝛼𝜆+2 . It is found that

𝑑𝜋𝐺 ∗
𝑑𝜃

𝛼+1

< 0 for 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2 ,

which suggests that 𝜋𝐺 ∗ is the highest at 𝜃 = 0 . However, it is also found
that

(𝛼𝜆−𝛼𝜆𝜃𝐿 +1)2
4(𝛼𝜆+1)

+

𝑖 2 +2𝛼𝜆𝜃𝐿 𝑖−2𝛼𝜆𝑖−2𝑖
4(𝛼𝜆+1)

< (𝜃𝐻 − 𝑖) − (𝜃𝐻 − 𝑖)2 , where 𝜃𝐿 < 𝜃𝐻 .

Therefore, the introduction of the participation cost could provide an explanation for
a monopoly firm to keep a certain level of reference point 𝜃 in reality, instead of
preferring a lowest possible reference point 𝜃 as mentioned in (38). Also, it is
mentioned that consumers would participate only if they have certain level of reference
point towards a high-value product. In other words, instead of the demand is started at
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𝜃 = 0, the demand function may start at certain level of reference-dependence where
consumers would be willing to bear the participation cost for inspecting the product.
This could also explain that the local maximum is no longer necessarily at 𝜃 = 0 in
reality.

Selling to reference-dependent consumers under competition
This subsection considers competition. Considering a Hotelling setting where there are
two identical firms located at the two extreme points. Firstly, we have 𝑥~𝑈[0,1] where
𝑥 is the preference of purchasing from firm A, so 1 − 𝑥 represents the preference of
purchasing the good from firm B. As two firms are locating at two extreme point
respectively, firm A locates at 𝑥 = 0 while firm B locates at 𝑥 = 1. These two firms
are selling identical product with same production cost (assumed to be zero) to
reference-dependent consumers. Assuming there is a reference point 𝜃 which is
exogenously determined and it is regarded as the expectation on the preference 𝑥 by
reference-dependent consumers. It is worth to notice that the reference point 𝜃 for this
context, unlike the previous model, does not refer to the expectation on intrinsic
value 𝑣. When 𝜃 is high numerically (i.e. 𝜃 is closer to 1), it is interpreted as a low
expectation on the preference of purchasing the good from firm A (i.e. 𝑥), as it is far
away from firm A (located at 𝑥 = 0). In other words, it would be same to consider a
high 𝜃 numerically means a high expectation on the preference of purchasing the good
from B. In a standard Hotelling setting, consumers have to bear a transportation cost 𝑡.
Under this setting, the transportation cost 𝑡 is regarded as the cost for purchasing the
good from either firm. So the total cost faced by a consumer located at 𝑥 who
purchases the good from firm A would be 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑡𝑥, while the total cost for purchasing
the good from firm B would be 𝑃𝐵 + 𝑡(1 − 𝑥). As two firms offer identical products,
consumers would receive same intrinsic value 𝑣 as a result.
When 𝑥 < 𝜃 , the realized preference of purchasing from firm A is less than the
reference point. It could be interpreted as there is a consumer who expects to pay 𝑃𝐴 +
𝑡𝑥 for purchasing the good from firm A, but he realized that his preference is 𝑥 and
𝑥 < 𝜃. So the total cost that the consumer has to pay is 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑡𝑥 only. It is less than
what he expects, that is, 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑡𝑥 < 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑡𝜃 when purchasing the good from firm A.
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In order words, that consumer is in fact facing a lower disutility than he had expected.
Therefore, 𝑥 < 𝜃 represents a gain under this setting, and the gain is 𝑡(𝜃 − 𝑥) .
However, when 𝑥 > 𝜃, the realized preference of purchasing from firm A is greater
than the reference point, which means that the consumer has to pay more if he
purchases from firm A, that is, 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑡𝑥 > 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑡𝜃 In this case there would be a loss
faced by the consumer for purchasing the good from firm A, and the loss is 𝑡𝜆(𝑥 − 𝜃),
where 𝜆 is a variable that measures the magnitude of loss-aversion and 𝜆 > 1, similar
to the model mentioned in the previous sections of this research. In addition,
consumers who face a loss may still purchase the good from the corresponding firm as
long as [𝑣 − 𝑡𝜆(𝜃 − 𝑥)] > (𝑃 + 𝑡𝑥) . Therefore, there are two types of consumers,
gain-type consumers and loss-type consumers. The total demand for goods from firm
A consists of 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 , where 𝑥1 < 𝜃 represents the gain-type consumers and 𝑥2 >
𝜃 represents the loss-type consumers. The total demand for goods offered by firm A
would be
𝐷𝑑𝐴 = 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 − 𝜃

(44)

As it is under a Hotelling setting, the total demand for goods offered by firm B would
be
𝐷𝑑𝐵 = 1 − 𝐷𝑑𝐴

(45)

To derive the price 𝑃𝐴 and 𝑃𝐵 set by firm A and firm B respectively, we have to
consider the critical gain-type consumer and the critical loss-type consumer who
purchase the good from either firm A or firm B is indifferent for both 𝑥 < 𝜃 and 𝑥 >
𝜃. This is the case that the consumer is a critical gain-type consumer for firm A, but a
critical loss-type consumer for firm B, so it is indifferent for that consumer to purchase
goods from between A and firm B. For the critical gain-type consumer who faces𝑥1 <
𝜃 , when the utility of purchasing from firm A received equals to the utility of
purchasing from firm B, we have
[𝑣 + 𝑡(𝜃 − 𝑥1 )] − (𝑃𝐴 + t𝑥1 ) = [𝑣 − 𝑡𝜆(𝜃 − 𝑥1 )] − [𝑃𝐵 + 𝑡(1 − 𝑥1 )]
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𝑥1 =

𝑃𝐵 −𝑃𝐴 + 𝑡 + 𝑡𝜃 + 𝑡𝜆𝜃
𝑡(𝜆 + 3)

(46)

where the critical gain-type consumer receives the intrinsic value v and gainutility 𝑡(𝜃 − 𝑥1 ), but at the same time he has to pay the cost for purchasing the good
from firm A 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑡𝑥1 , which is equal to when he is receiving the intrinsic value v but
a loss-utility −𝑡𝜆(𝜃 − 𝑥1 ), with the cost 𝑃𝐵 + 𝑡(1 − 𝑥1 ) when he decides to purchase
the good from firm B. As 𝑥1 < 𝜃 only represents part of the gain-type demand for
good for firm A (and loss-type demand for firm B), to derive the total demand for both
firms, we have to consider the case when 𝑥2 > 𝜃 as well, which represents the losstype demand for good from firm A (and gain-type demand for firm B). Similarly, we
have
[𝑣 + 𝑡𝜆(𝑥2 − 𝜃)] − (𝑃𝐴 + t𝑥2 ) = [𝑣 − 𝑡(𝑥2 − 𝜃)] − [𝑃𝐵 + 𝑡(1 − 𝑥2 )]
𝑥2 =

𝑃𝐵 −𝑃𝐴 + 𝑡 + 𝑡𝜃 + 𝑡𝜆𝜃
𝑡(𝜆 + 3)

(47)

The total demand faced by firm A and B derived from (47) and (48) respectively would
be
2𝑃𝐵 −2𝑃𝐴 + 2𝑡 − 𝑡𝜃 + 𝑡𝜆𝜃
𝑡(𝜆 + 3)

(48)

2𝑃𝐴 −2𝑃𝐵 + 𝑡 + 𝑡𝜆 + 𝑡𝜃 − 𝑡𝜆𝜃
𝑡(𝜆 + 3)

(49)

𝐷𝑑𝐴 ∗ =
𝐷𝑑𝐵 ∗ =

Then, to derive the optimal price by considering the maximized profit and taking the
first order condition, we have
𝑡(5 + 𝜆𝜃 + 𝜆 − 𝜃)
6
𝑡(4 − 𝜆𝜃 + 2𝜆 + 𝜃)
=
6

𝑃𝐴 ∗ =
𝑃𝐵 ∗
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(50)
(51)

The derivatives of the prices set by firm A 𝑃𝐴 ∗ and firm B 𝑃𝐵 ∗ with respect to 𝜃
are

𝑑𝑃𝐴 ∗
𝑑𝜃

=

𝑡(𝜆−1)
6

> 0 and

𝑑𝑃𝐵 ∗
𝑑𝜃

=−

𝑡(𝜆−1)
6

< 0. It shows that the price 𝑃𝐴 ∗ increases

when the reference point 𝜃 numerically increases for firm A (i.e. a low expectation on
the preference of purchasing the good from A), while the opposite is true for firm B.
Under the Hotelling setting, it means that firm A would set a higher price when
consumers have a lower expectation towards the preference of purchasing the good
from firm A, such that the 𝜃 is closer to another firm. The intuition is that, a lower
expectation towards preference of purchasing the good from a firm gives more room
for that firm to set a higher price as consumer prefers a lower expectation 𝜃 that
generates higher resulting total utility (it is true for both gain-type or loss-type
consumers). For the total demand for good faced by firm A and firm B, using the
derived optimal prices set by firm A (53) and firm B (54), the total demand faced by
firm A (51) and firm B (52) can be written as

𝐷𝑑𝐴 ∗ =

5 + 𝜆 − 𝜃 + 𝜆𝜃
3(𝜆 + 3)

(52)

𝐷𝑑𝐵 ∗ =

4 − 𝜆𝜃 + 2𝜆 + 𝜃
3(𝜆 + 3)

(53)

We could derive the derivatives with respect to 𝜃 such that we have
0, while

𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐵 ∗
𝑑𝜃

𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐴 ∗
𝑑𝜃

𝜆−1

= 3(𝜆+3) >

𝜆−1

= − 3(𝜆+3) > 0. It means that when the expectation of the preference

of purchasing the good from A decreases (and the reference point decreases is
represented by 𝜃 numerically increases as it is closer to 1), the total demand for A
would increases. It is because when consumers would expect they would be less
preferred to purchase the good from firm A as consumers prefer to have a lower
reference point, the realized preference 𝑥 would lead to greater “surprise” to
consumers who purchase from firm A such that the total utility received from
purchasing from firm A increases. Therefore, the reference point 𝜃 that is closer to 1
would increase the demand for good from A. In addition, as both of the price and the
total demand set by firm A increase when the reference point 𝜃 is closer to 1, we could
predict that the maximized profit received by firm A would also be increased when the
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reference point 𝜃 is closer to 1. Combining (50) with (52) for firm A and (51) with (53)
for firm B, the maximized profit for two firms would be

𝜋𝐴

∗

𝑡(5 + 𝜆 − 𝜃 + 𝜆𝜃)2
=
18(𝜆 + 3)

𝜋𝐵 ∗ =

𝑡(4 − 𝜆𝜃 + 2𝜆 + 𝜃)2
18(𝜆 + 3)

(54)
(55)

The derivative of the maximized profit with respect to the reference point 𝜃 for firm A
is
−

𝑑𝜋𝐴 ∗
𝑑𝜃

=

𝑡(𝜆−1)(5+𝜆−𝜃+𝜆𝜃)
9(𝜆+3)

𝑡(𝜆−1)(4−𝜆𝜃+2𝜆+𝜃)
9(𝜆+3)

> 0 , while the derivative for firm B is

𝑑𝜋𝐵 ∗
𝑑𝜃

=

< 0. The result confirms that the maximized profit received by

firm A would increase as the reference point decreases (represented by 𝜃 increases
numerically). That is, when there is a higher expectation towards the preference of
purchasing the good from firm A, firm A would receive a lower maximized profit.
The intuition is that, for a lower reference point, consumers would receive a higher
gain-utility from purchasing at a firm, which leads to a higher demand and at the same
time it enables firm to set a higher price. The result from this example which considers
a competition under Hotelling setting is consistent with the model proposed by this
study which assumes a monopoly firm facing reference dependent consumers. This
could be an example for showing the model that is also applicable to the situation of
competition under Hotelling setting.

VI. Conclusion
In this research I proposes a model to study the optimal price set by a monopoly firm
who faces reference-dependent consumers, under a given level of referencedependence. It is intuitive that consumers would prefer a low reference point as they
can receive highest total utility, because a low reference point could bring higher
surprise or lower disappointment to consumers. However, the preferred reference point
level may not be so obvious to firm. So, I proposed two pricing strategies, namely the
gain-type pricing strategy and the loss-type pricing strategy. Then I try to compare the
profits as a result of different prices set by a monopoly firm, for a given level of
reference-dependence. It is found that, firm could receive a highest maximized profit
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to set the price when(i) using the gain-type pricing strategy for 𝜃 ≤
𝛼+1

𝛼+1

, (ii) setting

𝛼+2

𝛼𝜆+1

price equals to the level of reference-dependence for 𝛼+2 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2, and (iii) using
𝛼𝜆+1

the loss-type pricing strategy for 𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2 . Any other prices could not generate a
higher maximized profit to firm. In addition, the results show that firm would prefer
(an exogenously determined) reference point that is as low as possible, as a lower
reference point would generate higher profit to firm. It is shown by the function of
maximized profit decreases as the reference point increase. Additionally, it is expected
that the result would be the same when the reference point is endogenously determined,
as it is just a corollary of the case of an exogenously determined reference point.
Therefore, we can conclude that when the monopoly firm is facing reference
dependent consumers, the firm would generally prefer the lowest possible reference
point, unless there are some variations added to the model which would fit some
situations in reality, such as the selling cost and participation cost. Then I consider a
situation for a firm which has to compete with another identical firm in the same
market with reference-dependent consumers under the Hotelling setting, for a given
reference point which is exogenously determined. Even though the reference point
refers to an expectation on the preference of purchasing the product from that firm by
a reference-dependent consumer, instead of an expectation on intrinsic value of the
product offered by that firm, it is found that a firm would receive higher maximized
profit for a lower reference point, and the price set by firm would be higher for a lower
reference point (but it is represented by a higher 𝜃 numerically in the model of
Hotelling setting). It could be concluded that firms who are facing competition under
Hotelling setting would prefer the lowest reference point. That means, a firm would
prefer consumers have a lower expectation on the preference of purchasing a product
from that firm. This result is consistent with the situation of a monopoly firm who is
facing reference-dependent consumers and there is no competition in the market. The
intuitions for those two cases are the same, consumers would receive higher total utility
for a lower reference point.

The proposed model could be improved in several aspects. Firstly, the intrinsic value
𝑣 is assumed to follow a uniform distribution. It is worth to examine the results if the
model is generalized, in which would be assumed to follow a more general distribution,
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rather than the uniform distribution. Therefore, it could show that those results found
by this study are only applicable for assuming v follows uniform distribution, or those
results still hold under a more general distribution. Secondly, this research does not
examine the formation of the reference point. The reference point is assumed to be
exogenously determined in the model. However, it is still worth to study the formation
of the reference point as it could help us to have a better understanding about the
observed phenomenon in reality which are different from the results derived from the
model, for example, a firm would wish to keep certain level of reference point in reality,
instead of a lowest possible reference point. Lastly, further researches in future on this
topic could be done by releasing some of the assumptions for the model. For example,
some varieties could be added to the model, such as allowing the firm to sell more than
one product, or allowing the competition that involve more than two firms, instead of
applying the Hotelling model to study the situation of the competition of two firms. I
believe that future researches on these aspects would help improving and enriching the
model such that it would be more comprehensive and complete.

VII. APPENDIX
Maximizing the Profit 𝝅𝑮 ∗ when 𝑷 = 𝑷𝑮 ∗
From (1), a gain-type consumer faces 𝑣 > 𝜃 and that consumer would only purchase
the good as long as 𝑢 ≥ 𝑃. From (7), the critical gain-type consumer would have 𝑣̂𝐺 =
𝑃𝐺 ∗ +𝛼𝜃
1+𝛼

, and the demand faced by the firm would then be 𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗ = 1 − 𝑣̂,
𝐺 so the profit

𝜋𝐺 ∗ would be

𝜋𝐺

∗

𝑃𝐺 ∗ + 𝛼𝜃
= 𝑃𝐺 (1 −
)
1+𝛼
∗

Considering the first-order-condition of 𝜋𝐺 ∗ with respect to 𝑃𝐺 ∗ , we have
𝑑𝜋𝐺 ∗
=0
𝑑𝑃𝐺 ∗
1−

2
𝛼𝜃
(𝑃𝐺 ∗ ) −
=0
1+𝛼
1+𝛼
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𝑃𝐺 ∗ =

𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1
2

It is (8). Then substituting (8) back into (7), we have

𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1
+ 𝛼𝜃
2
𝑣̂𝐺 =
1+𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛼𝜃 + 1
𝑣̂𝐺 =
2(1 + 𝛼)
which is (9). Then substitutes (9) into the demand 𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗ = 1 − 𝑣̂,
𝐺 we have
𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗ = 1 − 𝑣̂𝐺
𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗ = 1 −
𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗ =

𝛼 + 𝛼𝜃 + 1
2(1 + 𝛼)

𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1
2(1 + 𝛼)

It is (10). Then combining (8) and (10) to derive the maximized profit 𝜋𝐺 ∗ , we have
𝜋𝐺 ∗ = 𝑃𝐺 ∗ (𝐷𝑑𝐺 ∗ )
𝜋𝐺 ∗ =

𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1 𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1
(
)
2
2(1 + 𝛼)

𝜋𝐺

∗

(𝛼−𝛼𝜃 + 1)2
=
4(1 + 𝛼)

Maximizing the Profit 𝝅𝑳 ∗ when 𝑷 = 𝑷𝑳 ∗
From (1), a loss-type consumer faces 𝑣 < 𝜃 and that consumer would only purchase
the good as long as 𝑢 ≥ 𝑃. From (18), the critical loss-type consumer would have 𝑣
̂𝐿 =
𝑃𝐿 ∗ +𝛼𝜆𝜃
1+𝛼𝜆

, and the demand faced by the firm would then be 𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ = 1 − 𝑣
̂,
𝐿 so the profit

𝜋𝐿 ∗ would be
𝜋𝐿 ∗ = 𝑃𝐿 ∗ (1 −

𝑃𝐿 ∗ + 𝛼𝜆𝜃
)
1 + 𝛼𝜆
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Considering the first-order-condition of 𝜋𝐿 ∗ with respect to 𝑃𝐿 ∗ , we have
𝑑𝜋𝐿 ∗
=0
𝑑𝑃𝐿 ∗
1−

2
𝛼𝜆𝜃
(𝑃𝐿 ∗ ) −
=0
1 + 𝛼𝜆
1 + 𝛼𝜆
𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1
𝑃𝐿 ∗ =
2

It is (19). Then substituting (19) back into (18), we have

𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1
+ 𝛼𝜆𝜃
2
𝑣
̂𝐿 =
1 + 𝛼𝜆
𝛼𝜆 + 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1
𝑣
̂𝐿 =
2(1 + 𝛼𝜆)
which is (20). Then substitutes (20) into the demand 𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ = 1 − 𝑣
̂,
𝐿 we have
𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ = 1 − 𝑣
̂𝐿
𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ = 1 −
𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ =

𝛼𝜆 + 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1
2(1 + 𝛼𝜆)

𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1
2(1 + 𝛼𝜆)

It is (21). Then combining (19) and (21) to derive the maximized profit 𝜋𝐿 ∗, we have
𝜋𝐿 ∗ = 𝑃𝐿 ∗ (𝐷𝑑𝐿 ∗ )
𝜋𝐿 ∗ =

𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1 𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1
(
)
2
2(1 + 𝛼𝜆)
𝜋𝐿 ∗ =

(𝛼𝜆−𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1)2
4(1 + 𝛼𝜆)
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𝜶+𝟏 𝜶+𝟏

𝜶𝝀+𝟏

Profit Curve is Continuous over the Three Intervals 𝜽 ≤ 𝜶+𝟐, 𝜶+𝟐 ≤ 𝜽 ≤ 𝜶𝝀+𝟐 and
𝜶𝝀+𝟏

𝜽 ≥ 𝜶𝝀+𝟐
The following shows a way to show that the profit curve as (38) is continuous.
𝛼+1

𝛼𝜆+1

Considering the values of the critical points at 𝜃 = 𝛼+2 and 𝜃 = 𝛼𝜆+2 such that the
𝛼+1

profit received by the firm when setting 𝑃𝐺 ∗ or 𝑃 = 𝜃 are equal at 𝜃 = 𝛼+2 .
𝛼𝜆+1

Similarly, profit received by the firm when setting 𝑃𝐿 ∗ or 𝑃 = 𝜃 are equal at 𝜃 = 𝛼𝜆+2.
𝛼+1

So, considering 𝜃 =

𝜋𝐺

,

𝛼+2

∗

𝛼+1
2
(𝛼 − 𝛼𝜃 + 1)2 [𝛼 − 𝛼 (𝛼 + 2) + 1]
=
=
4(𝛼 + 1)
4(𝛼 + 1)
𝛼+1

𝛼+1

which has to be equal to 𝜋 = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) = (𝛼+2)(1 − 𝛼+2). Considering the critical
value 𝛼 = 0, 𝜋𝐺 ∗ =

(𝛼−𝛼𝜃+1)2
4(𝛼+1)

critical value 𝛼 = 1, 𝜋𝐺 ∗ =

=

[𝛼−𝛼(

[𝛼−𝛼(

𝛼+1
)+1]2
𝛼+2

4(𝛼+1)
𝛼+1
)+1]2
𝛼+2

4(𝛼+1)

𝛼+1

𝛼+1

1

= (𝛼+2) (1 − 𝛼+2) = 2. For another

𝛼+1

𝛼+1

2

= (𝛼+2) (1 − 𝛼+2) = 9. Therefore, the

profit received by the firm are equal when the firm is setting either 𝑃𝐺 ∗ or 𝑃 =
𝛼+1
𝜃(1 − 𝜃) at 𝜃 = 𝛼+2 for 1 < 𝛼 < 0. Similarly, for 𝑃𝐿 ∗ and 𝑃 = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) ,
𝛼𝜆+1

considering 𝜃 = 𝛼𝜆+2
𝜋𝐿 ∗

𝛼𝜆 + 1
[𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆 (
) + 1]2
(𝛼𝜆 − 𝛼𝜆𝜃 + 1)2
𝛼𝜆
+
2
=
)=
4(𝛼𝜆 + 1)
4(𝛼𝜆 + 1)

The critical values are 𝛼 = 0 , 𝛼 = 1 and 𝜆 = 1 . When 𝛼 = 0 and 𝜆 = 1 , 𝜋𝐿 ∗ =
[𝛼𝜆−𝛼𝜆(

𝛼𝜆+1
)+1]2
𝛼𝜆+2

4(𝛼𝜆+1)
[𝛼𝜆−𝛼𝜆(

𝛼𝜆+1
)+1]2
𝛼𝜆+2

4(𝛼𝜆+1)

𝛼𝜆+1

𝛼𝜆+1

1

𝛼𝜆+1

𝛼𝜆+1

2

= (𝛼𝜆+2) (1 − 𝛼𝜆+2) = 4 , while when 𝛼 = 1 and 𝜆 = 1 , 𝜋𝐿 ∗ =
= (𝛼𝜆+2) (1 − 𝛼𝜆+2) = 9 . It also shows that the profits are equal
𝛼𝜆+1

when the firm is setting either 𝑃𝐿 ∗ or 𝑃 = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) at 𝛼𝜆+2 for 1 < 𝛼 < 0 and 𝜆 > 1.
𝛼+1 𝛼+1

𝛼𝜆+1

Given that 𝜋𝐺 ∗ , 𝜋 = 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) and 𝜋𝐿 ∗ are continuous at 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼+2 , 𝛼+2 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝛼𝜆+2
𝛼𝜆+1

and 𝜃 ≥ 𝛼𝜆+2 respectively. According to the results above, we can conclude that profit
curve as (38) is continuous.
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